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1 Contemporary  American  political  culture  defies  simple  characterizations.  Belief  in
social  inclusivity  has  increased along with the cultural  diversity  of  the nation,  and
liberals  and  conservatives  have  clashed  as  they  campaigned  for  and  against
government  recognition  of  social  diversity  (including  protection  against
discrimination), and redistribution of resources (insuring “equality of condition”).1 As
increasing  numbers  of  voters  have  lost  faith  in  government  and  converted  to  the
religion of the free market in recent years, they have once again demonstrated the
degree to which commitments to religious worldviews, codes of moral behavior, and
visions of future social order have moved Americans to political action throughout the
history  of  the  nation.  Cultural  commitments,  rooted  in  attachments  to  values  and
beliefs,  principles and ideologies,  have periodically rivaled economic self-interest as
motivating forces in American public life.2
2 Since World War II, competing cultural visions have energized all aspects of American
politics,  including  presidential  campaigns,  congressional  policy-making,  state  and
federal  court  deliberations,  protest  demonstrations,  and  state  and  local  direct
democracy measures such as the recall, the referendum, and the initiative. From the
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late 1930s to the mid-1960s, critics of New Deal and post-New Deal liberalism sought to
preserve their vision of an ideal America from what they regarded as socialist and anti-
capitalist  doctrines  and  practices.  Invoking Revolutionary  patriot  Tom  Paine,  they
argued that  eternal  vigilance against  liberal  legislation was the necessary price  for
protecting  American  liberties.  The  1960s  and  1970s  witnessed  political  turmoil
generated by civil rights advocates, members of the “counterculture” and the New Left,
supporters  of  environmental  regulation,  feminists,  and proponents  of  Lesbian,  Gay,
Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) rights. These social movements demanded, to use the
language of social theorists such as Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth,
and Nancy Fraser, both recognition and redistribution: affirmative action, protection of
the rights of cultural minorities of various kinds, both religious and secular, and social
policies requiring government expenditures on behalf of immigrants, the poor, and the
disadvantaged. These tussles have produced a political culture that has become more
ideologically divided, especially among political party activists. Among Republicans and
Democrats alike, the proportion of moderates has declined significantly. And liberals
have increased from 38 to 55 percent in the Democratic Party, while conservatives have
increased  from  55  to  78  percent  in  the  Republican  Party.  In  addition,  as  political
scientist  Alan Abramowitz  puts  it  in  a  recent  assessment,  “there clearly  is  a  battle
raging  for  the  hearts  and  minds  of  American  voters,  and  cultural  issues  .  .  .  have
become major weapons in that battle . . . because there is a deep cultural divide in the
American electorate.”3
 
Cultural Politics and the Politics of Inclusion
3 Today,  in  the  name  of  individual  freedom,  some  conservative  Americans  question
liberal  beliefs  in  government’s  right  to  monitor  racial  discrimination  and
environmental protection. And, in the name of moral absolutism, other conservatives
challenge liberal beliefs in government’s right to legalize same sex marriages. Today’s
polarized  public  has  roots  in  the  early  post  World  War  II  years;  at  the  time,
conservatism owed as much to the reaction against the New Deal as to the attraction of
the  philosophical  tradition  associated  with  Edmund  Burke  and  Joseph  de  Maistre.
Critics of federal economic and social welfare legislation of the Roosevelt and Truman
Democratic  Party policies  demanded a return to  laissez-faire  practices  in industrial
relations  to  begin  the  restoration  of  their  version  of  personal  liberty.  Government
activism, according to this vision, fostered an unhealthy dependence on the state, and
that sapped the initiative and enterprise from American citizens.  Opponents of  the
Democratic coalition – labor unions, white ethnic urban workers, and black voters –
opposed Truman’s civil rights and full employment legislation and demanded that both
parties  rededicate  themselves  to  minimal  government.  Conservatives  wanted  a
Congress dominated by business-oriented advocates of free enterprise, rather than a by
a strong president of liberal persuasion. In their reckoning, state and local government
autonomy  was  more  compatible  with  individual  rights  than  a  strong  central
government.  State’s  rights,  local  control,  personal  liberty  and  preservation  of
traditional moral values: these were the principles of conservative critics of postwar
liberalism.
4 From the conservative point of view, as articulated in journals like Human Events and 
American Mercury, Democratic Party public officials who pushed for additional federal
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social  and  economic  policies  were  counterfeit  liberals.  True  liberalism  regarded
government regulation and social policy planning as a misuse of state power, and to the
extent  that  such  statist  imperatives  became  an  integral  feature  of  American
institutional life, conservatives sensed an ominous similarity between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. Happy to end the temporary wartime alliance between the two nations,
influential  commentators  on  the  right  warned  of  Stalin’s  appetite  for  territory  in
Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Roman Catholic  leaders  and  former  president  Herbert
Hoover  inveighed  against  “Godless  Russia”  and  the  “Communism  and  Creeping
Socialism sweeping over Europe.” 
5 Few episodes during the first decade after the war illustrated the complex nature of the
liberal  versus  conservative  dynamic  as  clearly  as  McCarthyism.  The  term
“McCarthyism” was frequently on the front pages of American newspapers from early
1950 to the end of 1954. It came to signify all of the disruptive consequences to public
life occasioned by charges made by Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy of communists
in high federal government positions. Although they were vague, contradictory, and
unsubstantiated,  the  charges  were  seized  upon  by  conservative  Republicans  in
Congress in order to weaken the Democratic administration of Harry Truman and pave
the  way  for  a  Republican  victory  in  1952.  Investigative  hearings  into  McCarthy’s
charges did not turn up communist cadres committing treason and espionage, but they
did allow anti-New Deal and Fair Deal  critics to pillory the Democrats for allegedly
enhancing  U.S.  vulnerability  to  external  threat  and  internal  subversion.  Although
McCarthy’s Wisconsin constituency provided him with little more than a perfunctory
majority  in  his  reelection,  and  although  Republican  president  Eisenhower  did  not
sanction the Senator’s  demagogic tirades against  “atheistic  Communism,” McCarthy
received vigorous support from numerous veterans’ organizations and from right-wing
Congressmen and the right-wing press. During most of his four years in the national
spotlight,  public  opinion  polls  showed  that  more  Americans  disliked  his  crude
blustering campaign than approved of his activities. Except for a brief period in 1954,
just before his demise, Republicans were about equally divided in their opinion of the
Senator, and Democrats, by a two to one margin, opposed him. McCarthy was of Irish
Catholic background, but Catholics did not support him en masse; like Protestants, they
were divided along party lines, and the Catholic press and the Catholic hierarchy were
also divided. McCarthy’s ability to capture national attention was due more to the fact
that his rhetoric and bombast fit the Truman administration’s own Democratic Party
anti-Communism than to any surge of conservative grassroots mass activism.
6 Having paved the way for “red baiting” and charges of “guilt by association” during the
1948 campaign against Progressive Party candidate Henry A. Wallace, Truman and both
conservative  and  moderate  Democrats  had  already  familiarized  journalists  and  the
reading public with dire warnings against “Reds, phonies, and parlor pinks.” During
McCarthy’s  four  years  of  flailing  away  at  supposed  saboteurs  the  media  routinely
sensationalized his activities. They also consistently overestimated his support among
the  public.  McCarthy’s  congressional  colleagues,  as  well  as  presidents  Truman  and
Eisenhower,  refused  directly  to  criticize  his  public  speeches  or  his  senate
investigations.  It  was  the  live  television  coverage  of  McCarthy’s  investigation  of
communism in the U.S. Army that provided the Senate with an excuse to condemn him.
Emboldened  by  their  sense  that  McCarthy’s  vulgar  behavior on  national  television
would disgust the viewers, Democrats and moderate Republicans overcame their fear of
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his power and censured him for breaking Senate rules and bringing their institution
into disrepute.
7 McCarthy’s  personal  decline  did  not  signal  the  demise  of  conservatism,  nor  did  it
provide liberalism with a new lease on life, though the Democratic Party did strengthen
its  hold  on  national  politics,  made  itself  the  majority  party  by  the  late  1950s,  and
recaptured the White House in 1960. The Democrats, however, were a deeply divided
party.  Most southern Democrats opposed the Supreme Court’s  school desegregation
decision  in  1954  and  condemned  President  Eisenhower’s  decision  to  send  National
Guard troops to force the integration of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Central High School
in 1954. In 1956, the state of Mississippi established a State Sovereignty Commission
charged with protecting the state’s white supremacist vision of American freedom from
federal  government  interference.  By  1963,  in  the  South  and  across  the  nation,
defenders of traditional values of white supremacy were actively opposing government
regulation and social policy planning on behalf of reforms that promoted recognition
and redistribution. This was evident in the reaction against President Kennedy’s order
that  the  Justice  Department  enforce  racial  equality  in  education.  Southern  white
supremacists  now  discovered  common  ground  with  Sunbelt  libertarians  as  well  as
White ethnics throughout the country. Many of the latter were conservative Catholics,
who refused to accept a government-imposed future marked by the racial integration
of  their  neighborhoods  and  the  use  of  their  tax  monies  for  the  redistribution  of
resources premised on social inclusion.4
8 Republicans Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan and Democrat George Wallace made
themselves national spokesmen for populist, conservative cultural politics during the
1960s.  Elected  to  the  U.S.  Senate  in  1952,  Goldwater  campaigned against  “creeping
socialism” by denouncing Walter  Reuther  of  the United Auto Workers  Union as  an
agent  of  international  communism.  In  1960,  he  published  The  Conscience  of  a
Conservative, expressing his concern that “in spite of a Conservative revival among the
people the radical ideas that were promoted by the New and Fair Deals under the guise
of Liberalism still  dominate the councils of our national government.” Two Catholic
public intellectuals, L. Brent Bozell, a former aide and speechwriter for Joe McCarthy,
and his brother in law William F. Buckley were the ghost writers for Goldwater’s book.
By 1964, three and a half million copies had been sold, and Goldwater gathered around
himself the leading lights of the nation’s conservative intelligentsia.5
9 Goldwater, joined by Alabama’s Democratic Party governor George Wallace, provided
nationally  publicized endorsement  of  white  supremacist  values  when they declared
themselves  unalterably  opposed  to  the  federal  government’s  imposition  of  racial
desegregation.  In  1964,  Goldwater  defeated  liberal  Nelson  Rockefeller  for  the
Republican nomination for president, and Wallace competed in the Democratic Party
primaries;  both  Goldwater  and Wallace  also  stressed  the  need to  enforce  “law and
order” in the face of assertive demonstrations in favor of civil rights and against U.S.
escalation  of  the  Vietnam  War.  Wallace  captured  a  third  of  the  votes  in  primary
contests in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland; Goldwater won not quite 39 percent of
the vote in the general election against Lyndon Johnson. He won Mississippi,  South
Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, and his home state of Arizona, but he lost urban
voters inside and outside the South except for Birmingham and Mobile, Alabama, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, and Jacksonville, Florida.
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10 Goldwater’s defeat  and  Wallace’s  limited  success  in  1964  did  not  represent  a
repudiation of the cultural values with which they were associated. In 1966, Ronald
Reagan  won  the  governor’s  office  in  California  after  campaigning  on  a  platform
centered on traditional values and condemnation of federal government activism, one
similar to those of Goldwater and Wallace. And when President Johnson signed into law
a  series  of  civil  rights,  equal  opportunity,  and  anti-poverty  measures,  forthrightly
calling for a “Second Reconstruction” that would at long last provide recognition of the
racial equality of Black Americans and redistribute resources to overcome the legacy of
slavery and racism, large segments of Democrats abandoned the party. In 1968 George
Wallace, running as the American Independent Party candidate against Johnson’s vice
president Hubert Humphrey and Republican Richard Nixon, won 10 million popular
votes and carried five states. Humphrey was limited to thirteen states and the District
of Columbia, losing New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, and California by less than
four percentage points. Wallace’s success, limited to the five Deep South states as it
was,  and  Nixon’s  own  successful  values-based  appeal  to  voters  nationwide
foreshadowed the slipping fortunes of the Democrats in the 1970s. Increasing numbers
of voters now believed that the Democratic Party was hostile to the alleged “traditional
values” of those Americans who regarded racial segregation and limited governmentas
positive mainstream principles. President Nixon claimed that these were the values of
Americans he famously characterized as “the Silent Majority.”
11 Given the way that television and the movies lavished attention on Hippies, the New
Left, Feminists, and sexual liberationists in the LGBT campaigns of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, it is not surprising that some uncritical pundits were tempted to conclude
that the nation was in the throes of a cultural revolution. In reality, as sociologists Ben
J.  Wattenberg and Richard M.  Scammon demonstrated in  their  1970 study The  Real
Majority, the popularity of long hair for men and short skirts for women did not signify
that  Americans  were  joyfully  partying  their  way  into  a  countercultural  “Age  of
Aquarius.”6 The thesis that conservatism had not only remained a potent political force
but also grown in strength received powerful support with the overwhelming defeat of
Democrat George McGovern in the presidential election of 1972. McGovern ran as the
tribune of a “new politics” dedicated to unprecedented efforts on behalf of recognition
and  redistribution  –  bringing  nonwhites,  women,  and  LGBT  activists  into  party
deliberations  from  the  grassroots  to  the  national  leadership  positions.  Voters
responded by reelecting Richard Nixon by the widest margin in the nation’s history;
McGovern won 17 electoral votes to Nixon’s 520 and Nixon carried every state except
Massachusetts and the District of Columbia.
12 By  the  mid-1970s,  it  was  clear  that  a  reformulation  of  the  landscape  of  American
political culture was underway. Public exposure of the crimes of Richard Nixon, and his
resignation in order to avoid being impeached generated demands that “law and order”
be enforced “inside the Beltway” (of Washington, D.C.),  as well  as on the streets of
America’s  big  cities.  The  nationwide  hue  and  cry  against  “Washington  Insiders”
encouraged Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia to challenge left liberal Democrats for
the party’s nomination in 1976. Carter’s victory in the election of 1976 against Gerald
Ford was a testimony to both the post-Watergate populist distrust of big government,
as well  as to the Georgian’s appeal to those voters who appreciated his Evangelical
Protestant  religious bona fides as  a  Southern Baptist  who taught Sunday school.  No
Democratic Party candidate since 1976 has been able to match Carter’s level of support
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among Southern voters,  large numbers of  whom refused to support candidates and
policies associated with federal government activism on behalf of affirmative action,
feminism, and equal rights for LGBT Americans.
13 In  1972,  Catholic  activist  Phyllis  Schlafly,  author  in  1964 of  A Choice  Not  an  Echo,  a
bestselling  book  promoting  the  Goldwater  candidacy,  organized  a  highly  successful
campaign against ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
that Congress had passed that year.7 Two years later,  Schlafly joined other Catholic
critics who mobilized with various grassroots “right to life” organizations to protest
and undo the Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe v. Wade decision that held state laws prohibiting
abortion to be unconstitutional. In the 1978 congressional and the 1980 presidential
election campaigns,  Evangelical  groups such as Jerry Falwell’s  Moral  Majority,  anti-
LGBT rights activists in groups like Anita Bryant’s Save Our Children campaign, pro-
family groups such as  Phyllis  Schlafly’s  Eagle  Forum, and free enterprise advocates
such as beer manufacturer Joseph Coors worked together to defeat more than a dozen
liberal Democratic Party senators and representatives. Ronald Reagan’s capture of the
White House in 1980 and again in 1984 also benefited from such conservative coalition
building. The Republican Party’s promise in its 1980 platform to seek a constitutional
amendment  banning  most  abortions  attracted  traditionalist  Catholics  and
fundamentalist Protestants who agitated for “the rights of the unborn.”
14 If the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 and 1990 signaled the beginning of
the end of the Cold War, the two-term presidency of Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1989
testified to the eroding of the Democratic Party’s ability to continue the programs of
recognition and redistribution central to Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society. Together,
Reagan and Congress instituted measures of tax reform and business deregulation that
were high on the agenda of free enterprise conservatives; his budgets made significant
cuts  in  the funding of  federally-supported redistribution of  resources  in  education,
housing,  and  welfare  intended  to  benefit  ethno-racial  minorities;  his  Justice
Department’s  civil  rights  agencies  adopted  less  aggressive  policies  regarding  the
enforcement  of  racial  and  gender  equality  in  the  workplace.  However,  Reagan
disappointed those conservatives who placed a high priority on such issues as ending
so-called “abortion on demand” and reinstituting prayers in public schools.
15 National politics in the 1990s demonstrated the prescience of Burton Yale Pines’ 1982
book Back to Basics, which argued that a cultural politics conservative movement was
now “challenging liberalism on every major front and ending the liberal monopoly of
the agenda setting process.”8 In 1992, voters elected Bill Clinton, the first Democrat to
serve since Jimmy Carter left office at the end of 1980. Clinton’s victory was possible
partly  because  he  was  a  self-styled  “New  Democrat”  who  had  embraced  the
conservative critique of “Big Government,” partly because he proudly proclaimed his
devotion to his Baptist religious convictions, partly because he promised to support the
“Law  and  Order”  priorities  that  conservatives  had  demanded  since  the  1960s,  and
partly because he promised to “end welfare as we know it.” Once in office,  Clinton
appealed to cultural liberals among Democrats, especially to his LGBT constituency; he
attempted  to  keep  a  campaign  promise  to  overturn  the  nation’s  ban  against
homosexuals  in  the  military  services.  When  his  proposed  Congressional  legislation
failed, he issued a Presidential Defense Directive 1304.26 that put in place a halfway
measure known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Conservative opposition to this
policy,  combined  with  widespread  opposition  to  Clinton’s  national  health  care
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proposal,  and to criticism of First Lady Hilary Rodham Clinton’s leading role in the
process  that  created  that  proposal,  generated  a  Republican  landslide  in  the  1994
Congressional  elections.  Clinton managed to  hold on to  the presidency in  the 1996
election, but Republicans gained strength in congressional and state elections during
the  late  1990s.  George  W.  Bush’s  victory  in  2000  and  2004  was  also  a  victory  for
conservative cultural politics, and the 2008 election of Barack Obama, the first non-
Southern Democrat to win the presidency since John F. Kennedy in 1960, triggered the
Tea Party movement – a negative reaction fueled by both conservative cultural politics
and populist economic discontent. This negative reaction – and it has come from the
grassroots  as  well  as  from  conservative  elites –  should  not  surprise  us  given  the
historical  context  we have  just  reviewed.  Recent  research on the  ideology  and the
social character of Tea Party supporters makes it clear that both values-related and
economic-related grievances animate them and this dual dynamic is also evident in the
current campaign.9
 
Cultural Politics in the Golden State
16 Proponents of conservative cultural politics have been especially active in California in
the half century since 1962, when the Golden State surpassed New York to become the
most populous state in the union. A striking illustration is how activists on the Right
have used the state’s Progressive Era direct democracy mechanisms to stymie liberal
attempts to grant state government the power to ban racial discrimination in housing
(Proposition  14  in  1964),  and  to  prohibit  the  legalization  of  same  sex  marriage
(Proposition 8 in 2008). The changing character of cultural politics,  as conservatism
grew from an anemic marginal presence into a potent mainstream dynamic, can be
seen in the differences between Catholic participation in the Proposition 14 (Prop 14)
and Proposition 8 campaigns in California.10 The events associated with Prop 14 began
in  1959  when  California  passed  its  first  fair  housing  laws.11 Four  years  later,
Assemblyman  Byron  Rumford  introduced  AB  1240  in  April,  1963.  This  proposed
ordinance  aimed  to  prohibit  owners  from  inquiring  as  to  the  race,  color,  religion,
national origin or ancestry of prospective buyers/tenants, and expanded existing law
to include about 70 percent of the state’s housing. Transactions involving realtors and
brokers were also to be included.12 Shortly after Assemblyman Rumford introduced the
legislation, the official San Francisco Catholic newspaper the Monitor ran an expansive
article supporting the proposed legislation. The Monitor’s support for racial equality in
housing was followed two months later by a pastoral letter from the American Bishops
entitled  “On  Racial  Harmony.”  The  Bishops  declared  unambiguously  that  racial
segregation was a violation of Christian teaching and argued that “respect for personal
rights is both a moral duty, and a civic one.”13
17 By the end of September, the California Assembly and Senate approved the Rumford
Fair Housing Act, and liberal Democratic Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown signed it
into  law.  Immediately,  the  California  Real  Estate  Association  announced  a  direct
democracy  campaign  to  gather  signatures  for  a  ballot  initiative  leading  to  a
constitutional  amendment  to  nullify  the  new  law.  Californians  opposed  to  the  fair
housing  legislation  avidly  signed  the  petitions,  and  by  February  25,  1964,  enough
signatures, half of them from Los Angeles County alone, were confirmed to put the
measure on the ballot. Governor Brown, a San Franciscan and a practicing Catholic,
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tried to derail the future success of the measure by convincing lawmakers to place it on
the fall, rather than the spring, ballot. Brown imagined (wrongly, as it turned out) that
the  larger  liberal  turnout  expected  in  the  November  presidential  election  would
condemn the measure to defeat. As did the San Francisco Catholic Interracial Council,
Brown realized the potential significance of repeal of the Rumford Act. If California
approved  a  constitutional  amendment  barring  further  local  or  state  legislation  on
behalf of housing rights regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin,
the forces of conservative reaction would win a substantial national victory.14
18 Most of the Catholic bishops of California went on record in opposition to Prop 14, but
Cardinal McIntyre of Los Angeles refused to condemn the measure, declaring that “the
Roman Catholic Church doesn’t take a stand on political matters.”15 In San Francisco,
Archbishop  McGucken  announced  that  “clergy  did  not  take  the  forefront  in  these
matters” (the Prop 14 fight), but it was “right for the Church to be involved but with
prudence  and  moderation.”  McGucken  therefore  declined  invitations  to  appear  in
person and declare his position forthrightly and instead designated or allowed those
who would speak uncompromisingly against Prop 14 to represent the Church. When
McGucken did act, or speak, he avoided outright attacks on the supporters of Prop 14
while arguing that the measure deserved repudiation. He insisted that newspaper ads
asking  voters  not  to  sign  the  petition  to  get  the  measure  on  the  ballot  avoid  all
“accusation” of the real estate industry. At the same time, he insisted on strengthening
the language of the ads so as to make explicit that “the initiative now proposed would
not only kill existing California law, but would prohibit legislative, and other agencies
of state and local government, including the courts, from dealing with acts of religious
or social discrimination in housing.”16 The changes were made; the full page ad ran in
the  New  York  Times,  the  San  Francisco  Examiner,  and  the  San Francisco  Chronicle on
December 23, 1963.17
19 McGucken was invited to give the invocation when Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. appeared
at an anti-14 rally at San Francisco’s Cow Palace auditorium on May 26, 1964. Following
past practice, he declined, sending Father Eugene Boyle in his place. Boyle condemned
Prop 14 as representing “an alien, un-American and unchristian concept of property
which must be rejected.”18 In late May, the Archbishop himself was quoted as saying
that  Catholics  who  supported  Prop  14  made  “errors  in  conscience”  (in  Catholic
parlance,  meaning  that  a  person  can  perform  an  objectively  immoral  act  while
remaining  subjectively  free  of  guilt  because  his  conscience  is  sincere  and  free  of
immoral intent).19 He was personally opposed to repeal, but he would not go so far as to
say that Catholics had a moral duty to vote against it. Edward Keating, publisher of the
local left-wing Catholic magazine Ramparts publicly criticized the Archbishop, calling
him “derelict in his duties” for opposing the measure on constitutional, rather than on
moral grounds.20
20 Archbishop McGucken did not provide public leadership in the campaign against Prop
14, and he did not speak out directly in official capacity until two weeks before the
election, but he made no attempt to restrain or moderate the editorial content or the
reportage on the controversy over fair housing by the official diocesan newspaper. By
late August, 1964, with Barry Goldwater campaigning for president and the Prop 14
campaign in high gear, the Monitor editorialized that “no California voter should vote
‘yes’ on 14,” citing the authority of Bishop Floyd L. Begin of Oakland that “Prop. 14
contradicts what is clear and universal Catholic social teaching.”21 Then on October 22,
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Archbishop McGucken spoke out strongly against Prop 14 in a pastoral letter, and the
accompanying editorial  instructed readers that although the measure “has split  the
state and has also created differences within the Church” the Archbishop spoke for the
Church and “The Church does not use authority recklessly.”22
21 Catholics who objected to sermons against Prop 14 and the distribution of anti-Prop 14
literature after Mass gave tacit  approval to the point of  view announced by Robert
Miller, head of the Northern California Committee for “Yes on 14.” Miller insisted that
the issue was political, not religious, and discussion of its merits did not belong in the
pulpit.  In  Los  Gatos,  a  Santa  Clara  County  town  60  miles  south  of  San  Francisco,
Catholics claiming to represent 60 parishes organized a “Yes on 14” group, but such
organized support for the measure did not exist in San Francisco.23
22 On November 3, 1964 California voters passed Prop 14, thereby overturning the state
fair housing legislation, by a two-to-one majority. Prop 14 passed even in San Francisco,
but by a much narrower margin:  150,314 “yes” votes;  134,611 “no” votes.  Governor
Brown declared that he would not enforce the new constitutional amendment until its
constitutionality was verified and the California Secretary of State refused to certify
the vote. The federal government threatened to hold further federal funds for slum
clearance in view of  the victory of  Prop 14.  John Delury of  the Catholic  Interracial
Council  and Catholic  Social  Justice  Commission and Earl  Raab of  the  San Francisco
Human Relations Clearing House immediately set to work in support of the ultimately
successful legal campaign to overturn the voter mandate in the courts. Eventually the
California  State  Supreme  Court  declared  Prop  14  unconstitutional,  and  the  U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the ruling.24
23 Soon  after  the  courts  overturned  the  California  electorate’s  resounding  2  to  1
nullification of the legislature’s fair housing regulations, voters refused to give liberal
governor  Edmund  G.  Brown  a  third  term and  elected  conservative  Ronald  Reagan.
During Reagan’s eight years in office and beyond, the politics of inclusion continued to
thrive in the competition produced by ethno-racial and economic class interest groups,
feminists, LGBT residents, and many others, including those representing poor elderly
residents,  the  homeless,  and  the  disabled. At  the  same  time,  large  numbers  of
conservative Catholics rejected John F. Kennedy’s famous 1960 insistence that religion
should be practiced in private. They demanded that religion be deprivatized, and many
Catholics coalesced with Protestant evangelicals such as Billy Graham and later Jerry
Falwell who rejected the liberal prescription that the common good should be premised
on  unlimited  individual  rights  and  unbounded  individual  freedom  of  choice.25 Two
years after Reagan became governor of California, Pope Paul VI issued his encyclical
Humane Vitae, which reasserted the Church’s traditional prohibition of artificial birth
control.  From  then  on,  and  especially  since  1973  when  leading  Catholics  began  to
mobilize  against  the  Roe  v.  Wade  Supreme  Court  decision  on  abortion  rights,  the
Catholic Church hierarchy and conservative Catholic lay men and women have played
increasingly active roles in direct democracy cultural politics. California was the site of
one of the first direct democracy campaigns related to same sex marriage when San
Francisco,  in  1982,  passed  the  nation’s  first  municipal  law  extending  to  “domestic
partners”  of  city  employees  benefits  historically  available  only  to  married  spouses.
Archbishop John R. Quinn (served 1977–1995) wrote to Mayor Feinstein urging her to
veto  the  city’s  pioneering  domestic  partners  legislation  passed  by  the  Board  of
Supervisors  (San  Francisco’s  city  council)  in  1982.  Quinn’s  letter  was  generally
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acknowledged to have convinced the mayor to issue the veto, which the board did not
overturn. And when the board unanimously passed a second version seven years later,
it  was the Church and Catholic activists who led a successful  referendum vote that
rendered the legislation null and void. Then, in 1990 city voters reestablished domestic
partners legislation by initiative, and this time the Catholic-supported repeal measure
went down to a solid defeat. The Archbishop made no apology for his political activism. 
“Sometimes, powerful people do not want to be contradicted with opposing views
that show the moral weakness of their position. They want the church to be silent
unless it agrees with them. . .  [but] it’s my right and obligation to speak on the
moral dimensions of these public issues.”26
24 Two  years  after  San  Francisco’s  mayor  vetoed  the  city’s  first  domestic  partners
ordinance,  another  northern  California  city,  Berkeley,  established  the  first  such
legislation in the United States. Since then, same sex marriage issues gradually became
a new frontier in the nation’s politics of inclusion. In 1996 conservatives succeeded in
passing a federal Defense of Marriage Act aimed at preventing LGBT efforts to legalize
same sex marriage in any state of the union. Four years later, opponents of same sex
marriage  placed  Proposition  22  on  the  ballot  in  California,  specifying  that  "only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." Voters
approved  the  measure  in  a  vote  of  61  percent  to  39  percent.  When  Mayor  Gavin
Newsom in February 2004 announced that San Francisco would violate state law and
issue marriage licenses to same sex couples, he set in motion a battle that continues
today. In May 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled that same sex couples had a
constitutional right to marry, but in November 2008 voters approved Proposition 8,
which added prohibition of same sex marriage to the state constitution. The Catholic
Church and Catholic lay organizations actively campaigned in favor of Proposition 8,
even making a controversial alliance with Protestant evangelicals and Church of Latter
Day  Saints  (Mormon)  activists  who  were  also  opposed  to  same  sex  marriage.27 In
contrast to the Proposition 22 vote, this time opponents of same sex marriage won by
only 4 percentage points (52 percent versus 48 percent); with conservative Black and
Latino  voters  contributing  to  the  margin  of  victory.  Legal  challenges  seeking  to
overturn the results of this exercise in direct democracy commenced immediately after
passage of Proposition 8 and are still ongoing; in February 2012, a federal district court
panel ruled 2 to 1 that the measure was unconstitutional and as of this writing, appeals
of that latest decision by opponents of same sex marriage are still pending.28
 
Conclusion
25 Californians have debated the pros and cons of fair housing and same sex marriage in
the context of more than a half-century of contests between liberal and conservative
visions regarding the constitutional rights of individuals and the duties of government
toward groups historically excluded from participation in policy-making. The politics
of  inclusion  since  the  1960s  has  produced  undeniable  progress  in  human  rights
legislation,  but  debate  continues  as  to  the  extent  of  the  practical  consequences  of
formal equality. As David Harvey, Michael J. Sandel, David Hollinger, Daniel R. Pinello,
and Miriam Smith have shown, de jure political inclusion has not guaranteed economic
security,  political  equality,  or  generated the  social  solidarity  necessary  for  “us  and
them” to become “we the people.”29 Californians have joined the national debate about
the  role  that  religious  tradition  and  faith-based  activism  should  play  in  politics;
Liberal and Conservative Visions in United States Politics since 1945: Cultur...
Siècles, 37 | 2013
10
advocates of a “comprehensive pluralism” continue to push back against the post-1980s
“deprivatization” of religion by those who demand increasing “the power of religion in
the public sphere.”30
26 Catholic involvement in the Proposition 14 and Proposition 8 campaigns in California
demonstrates  cases  in  which  cultural  politics  linked  to  values  linked  to  competing
liberal and conservative visions have manifested themselves in the largest state in the
nation. In the future,  Catholic conservatives and other conservative Americans who
have joined them in the nation’s cultural politics will continue to demand that public
policy should derive from a foundation of faith-based morality, that individual rights
have God-given limits, and that government has a duty to require citizens to learn and
practice  a  religious-based  civic  creed.  But  as  the  evidence  of  the  Proposition  8
controversy and of several flare ups in the 2012 presidential campaign suggest, their
power will be limited by liberal and moderate Americans who demand that the public
sphere be open to all, and that public policy recognize, honor, and encourage multiple
conceptions of the common good, not enshrine a single tradition-based vision of the
public interest. By all indications, competing liberal and conservative visions expressed
through the medium of cultural politics will continue to powerfully mark California –
and national – politics today and in the foreseeable future.31
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ABSTRACTS
Contemporary  American  political  culture  is  filled  with  complexity,  defies  simple
characterizations,  and  manifests  an  uneasy  tension  between  recognizing  (even  honoring)
cultural  diversity  and  practicing  (even  celebrating)  class  inequality.  The  belief  in  social
inclusivity  has  increased and so  has  the  belief  in  direct  democracy,  while  at  the  same time
increasing numbers of Americans have lost faith in government and converted to the religion of
the free market. The half century since the beginning of the Sixties, a decade associated with
hyper-liberalism, has witnessed a steady increase in the appeal of conservatism.  In the name of
individual  freedom,  some  Americans  question  government’s  right  to  monitor  racial
discrimination, while others challenge government’s right to legalize same-sex marriages.  This
paper will begin with a review of cultural politics and conservatism in American political culture,
and then it will analyze recent research on the use of direct democracy by the opponents and
proponents of affirmative action and same sex marriage, with a particular focus on the California
experience.  The paper will conclude with a reflection on how these contests may relate to the
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theory  and  practice  of  multicultural  citizenship  in  the  United  States  and  other  pluralist
democracies.  
La culture politique américaine contemporaine est  pleine de complexité,  elle  met au défi  les
classifications  simples  et  manifeste  une  tension  forte  entre reconnaître  (voire  honorer)  la
diversité culturelle et pratiquer (voire célébrer) l’inégalité de classe. La croyance dans l’absence
de discrimination sociale, de même que la croyance dans la démocratie directe, ont augmenté,
alors  que  dans  le  même  temps  un  nombre  croissant  d’Américains  ont  perdu  la  foi  dans  le
gouvernement et se sont convertis à la religion du marché libre. Le demi-siècle qui a suivi les
années 1960, une décennie associée à l’hyper-libéralisme, a été le témoin d’une montée constante
de l’attrait pour le conservatisme. Au nom de la liberté individuelle, des Américains mettent en
cause  le  droit  du  gouvernement  à  contrôler  la  discrimination  raciale,  tandis  que  d’autres
contestent le droit du gouvernement à légaliser le mariage homosexuel. Cet article étudie, dans
un  premier  temps,  les  politiques  culturelles  et  le  conservatisme  dans  la  culture  politique
américaine,  puis  il  analyse,  dans  un second temps,  les  recherches  récentes  sur  l’usage  de  la
démocratie directe par les opposants et les partisans de la discrimination positive et du mariage
homosexuel, en s’attachant plus particulièrement à l’expérience californienne. En conclusion est
proposée  une réflexion sur  les  liens  pouvant  exister  entre  ces  contestations  et  la  théorie  et
pratique  de  la  citoyenneté  multiculturelle  aux  États-Unis  et  dans  les  autres  démocraties
pluralistes.
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